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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFFREY LEON HUGHES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010617-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court when it refused to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen 
property because the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction? This Court will 
"affirm a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence 'if, 
upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, 
we conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Davis, 
965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999) (citations 
omitted). -
This issue was preserved in an oral motion for a directed verdict made at the 
close of the State's case (R. 164 at 131-32).
 : 
2. Whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to amend the information 
at trial from receiving stolen property to unauthorized control of a motor vehicle 
pursuant to State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984). Because this issue was not 
directly raised in the trial court this Court should review this issue for plain error. This 
Court reviews claims of plain error for obvious and prejudicial error. State v. Verde, 
110 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 and Utah Code Annotated § 41-la-
1314 is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey Leon Hughes appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of 
the Fourth District Court after being convicted by a jury of theft by receiving stolen 
property, a second degree felony, and speeding and driving on suspicion, class C 
misdemeanors. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
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Jeffrey Leon Hughes was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court 
on or about January 24, 2001, with theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408, speeding and driving on 
suspension, class C misdemeanors (R. 5). 
On March 30, 2001, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Gary 
D. Stott (R. 31-32, 163). After the hearing, the trial court found probable cause that 
Hughes committed the offenses (R. 31, 163 at 26-27). Hughes was also arraigned on 
the charges and "not guilty" pleas were entered (R. 163 at 28). 
On May 8, 2001, a jury trial was held on the charges with Judge Stott presiding 
(R. 78-79, 164). After deliberation, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty on all 
three counts (R. 78, 114, 164 at 163). At the close of the State's case, Hughes moved 
for a directed verdict on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction for receiving stolen property and that when Hughes received the vehicle in 
question it was not stolen as required by the statute (R. 164 at 131-32). The trial court 
denied the motion (R. 164 at 135). 
On June 29, 2001, Hughes filed a motion for a new trial (R. 139-42). On 
August 16, 2001, the motion was denied by signed memorandum decision (R. 154-56). 
On July 2, 2001, Hughes was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1-15 years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 145-46). 
On June 29 and September 5, 2001, Hughes filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth 
District Court (R. 128, 158). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Richard Hales 
Richard Hales, a Spanish Fork police officer, testified that on January 17, 2001, 
he was assigned to the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force. On that day he 
observed a vehicle traveling eastbound on 500 South in Spanish Fork (R. 164 at 85). 
The vehicle was speeding and had a Brigham Young University sticker across the back 
window (R. 164 at 85). In addition, Hales did not believe that the individual driving 
the vehicle "didn't fit the description of a BYU student" so Hales followed the vehicle 
for a period and eventually executed a traffic stop on the vehicle over for driving 48 
m.p.h. in an area where the speed limit was 30 m.p.h. (R. 164 at 85-88). 
Hales made contact with the driver, Jeffrey Hughes, who had a goatee (R. 164 at 
88, 95-96). Hughes did not have a license and informed Hales that the vehicle 
belonged to his girlfriend (R. 164 at 88-89). Hales asked Hughes for the vehicle's 
registration and name of his girlfriend and, according to Hales, "[h]e couldn't answer 
the question. It took him a second. He had to pause. He opened the jockey box, 
rummaged through the jockey box. There was the insurance and registration sitting 
there. He looked at, and he said, Christy. That's it, Christy" (R. 164 at 89). Hales 
testified that the registered owner of the vehicle was Christy Shumway (R. 164 at 89). 
Hales contacted dispatch to perform a license check on Hughes (R. 164 at 90). 
Dispatch reported that Hughes' license was suspended (R. 164 at 90). Hughes also had 
dispatch run a check on the vehicle and dispatch indicated that the vehicle had been 
reported as stolen from Provo on January 8, 2001 (R. 164 at 90). 
Hales called and waited for another officer to arrive on the scene and then 
Hughes was arrested and transported to the Utah County Jail (R. 164 at 90-91). During 
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the booking process Hales spoke with Hughes (R. 164 at 92-93). According to Hales, 
Hughes indicated that "he didn't mean to steal the vehicle; that he panicked. That when 
this girl had this overdose, and he told me the story of the situation with the ambulance 
and the Super 8 Motel. He panicked and didn't know what to do with the vehicle" (R. 
164 at 93). On cross-examination Hales clarified that Hughes told him that he did not 
intend to steal the vehicle but that he did not know what to do with it and he panicked 
(R. 164 at 96). Hughes told Hales that he was taking Shumway to the hospital and 
that she had given him the keys to the car (R. 164 at 98-99). 
B. Testimony of Bud Walker 
Bud Walker, a detective with the ProVo City Police Department, testified that on 
January 5, 2001, he was called to the hospital to help identify and woman who had 
been brought in after overdosing on sleeping pills (R. 164 at 100, 105). The woman 
was identified as Christy Shumway. On January 6, 2001, Shumway's family raised 
some questions about the whereabouts of her vehicle (R. 164 at 100). 
Walker testified that he learned that Shumway had been staying in a motel and 
he spent the next few days looking for the vehicle--a 1990 black Ford Escort-in motel 
parking lots in the south end of Provo (R. 164 at 100, 101). Walker did not locate the 
vehicle and on January 8, 2001, filled out a stolen vehicle report at the request of the 
Shumway family (R. 164 at 101). 
Walker testified that on January 17, 2001, he received a telephone call from 
Hales and arranged for the vehicle to be retrieved (R. 164 at 101-02). Walker testified 
that he learned through Hales that the car belonged to Hughes' girlfriend, that "he 
couldn't remember is girlfriend's name, that he intended on taking it back to her, didn't 
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know her address, and [that] he didn't have any intention of keeping it" (R. 164 at 
104). 
Walker had another officer pick up the vehicle and he went to Hughes' last 
known address and spoke with Laura Haycock, who indicated that she had knowledge 
of he vehicle (R. 164 at 102-03). 
When Walker inventoried the vehicle, he testified that he found a key ring 
belonging to Hughes attached to Shumway's key ring (R. 164 at 106). Beer and 
cigarettes were also found in the vehicle (R. 164 at 106). 
C. Testimony of Christy Shumway 
Christy Shumway testified that she owns a 1990 black Ford Escort that has a 
BYU sticker on the back (R. 164 at 108). Shumway testified that on January 5, 2001, 
she was staying at the Motel 8 in Prov o (R. 164 at 109-10). On that day Shumway 
overdosed on sleeping pills at the motel; and after she got dizzy she decided to drive 
herself to the hospital (R. 164 at 110). While Shumway was in the hallway she realized 
that she would need assistance to get to the hospital so she stopped the first people she 
saw and asked for assistance (R. 164 at 110). Shumway testified that she asked Hughes 
to take her to the hospital and that she handed him the keys to her car because he did 
not have a vehicle (R. 164 at 110, 114). Hughes helped her down the stairs and into 
her car (R. 164 at 110). Shumway also showed Hughes one of the bottles of sleeping 
pills in case she lost consciousness (R. 164 at 111). 
Shumway testified that she did not give Hughes permission to keep the vehicle 
but that she also did not give him any instructions on what to do with it (R. 164 at 111, 
115, 117). Shumway lost consciousness on the way to the hospital (R. 164 at 112). 
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Shumway testified that she did not smoke and had not had a beer in about six-
months (R. 164 at 112-13). Shumway also testified that when the vehicle was returned 
the antenna was taped to the side of the car and the steering wheel had been fixed (R. 
164 at 113). 
Shumway testified that without Hughes assistance in getting to the hospital she 
likely would have died (R. 164 at 115). 
D. Testimony of Daniel Dove 
Daniel Dove, a Provo City police officer, testified that on January 5, 2001, he 
was called to a medical emergency on Freedom Blvd. (200 West) at Center Street in 
Provo (R. 164 at 121). When Dove arrived on the scene, an ambulance had already 
responded and was just leaving (R. 164 at 121). Dove spoke with Hughes who 
indicated that he had been approached at a motel by a friend, who needed to go to the 
hospital, and who asked him to drive her to the hospital; and that on the way there was 
an a medical emergency so he stopped and called for assistance (R. 164 at 122, 124). 
Dove testified that Hughes asked him if he should take the car and Dove 
responded that would not be a problem (R. 164 at 123). Dove also testified that 
Hughes indicated that he would take the car back to the motel (R. 164 at 123). Dove 
also testified that it was possible that Hughes had tried to give him the keys and turn the 
vehicle over to him (R. 164 at 126). Dove also testified that he may have told Hughes 
something to the effect that "if I were you, I'd take [the vehicle] back to the motel, but 
I'm not going to tell you what to do with it" (R. 164 at 127, 126). 
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E. Testimony of Laura Haycock 
Laura Haycock testified that she has known Hughes since about 1997 and that 
they are friends (R. 164 at 129). Haycock resides at 144 South 600 East, Apt. B, and 
that Hughes stayed at the residence for a few nights (R. 164 at 128). Haycock testified 
that on January 5, 2001, Hughes came to the residence driving a navy or black vehicle 
and that Hughes had told her that "the lady who owned it had OD'd from a bottle of 
sleeping pills" and had given the car to him (R. 164 at 130). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hughes asserts that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to establish 
that the vehicle was stolen property when he initially received or retained possession of 
it; and that a necessary element of the offense is that the property must have been 
stolen-or the defendant must have believed that it had been stolen-before the defendant 
received, retained or disposed of it. Hughes was not charged with theft but with 
receiving stolen property. Accordingly, Hughes asserts that the trial court erred in 
failing to dismiss the charge against him for insufficient evidence. 
Alternatively, Hughes asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing 
to amend the charge from theft by receiving stolen property to unauthorized control 
over a motor vehicle pursuant to State v. Hill. 
I 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE 
CHARGE OF RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY FOR 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Hughes asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict 
and dismiss the charge of receiving stolen property on grounds that the evidence 
introduced by the State at trial was insufficient to establish the commission of the 
offense. 
In State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined the basic elements of receiving stolen property pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-408(1): 
"(1) property belonging to another has been stolen; 
(2) the defendant received, retained or disposed of the stolen property; 
(3) at the time of receiving, retaining or disposing of the property the 
defendant knew or believed that the property was stolen; and 
(4) the defendant acted purposely to deprive the owner of the possession of the 
property." 
State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Utah App. 1987). In this case Instruction 17b 
set forth the elements of receiving stolen property as follows: 
"(1) that the defendant 
(2) on or about January 17, 2001 
(3) in Utah County, Utah; 
(4) retained [the] property of another; 
(5) knowing that the property had been stolen; . 
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(6) intending to deprive the owner of it 
(7) and the property stolen was an operable motor vehicle" 
(R. 111). Hughes asserts that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to 
establish that the vehicle was stolen property when he initially received or retained 
possession of it; and that a necessary element of the offense is that the property must 
have been stolen-or the defendant must have believed that it had been stolen-before 
the defendant received, retained or disposed of it. Hughes was not charged with theft 
but with receiving stolen property. 
Hughes has marshaled the evidence in his statement of facts but will review 
those facts as necessary to adequately address this issue. This Court will "affirm a trial 
court's denial of a motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence 'if, upon 
reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we 
conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Davis, 
965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
Hughes asserts that in all prior cases in Utah where the defendant was properly 
convicted of receiving stolen property, the defendant either knew or had a belief that 
the property was stolen at the time the defendant received, retained or disposed of the < 
property. See, e.g, State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 
P.2d 88 (Utah 1999) (Defendant found in possession of property that was marked with 
name of another therefore defendant must have believed that property was likely 
stolen); State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 
1997) (Defendant found in possession of stolen car with conflicting explanations as to 
i 
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his possession of it); State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1991) (Defendant's name found on pawn receipt of items stolen from 
autobody shop); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271 (Utah App. 1989) (Defendant purchased 
stolen goods from undercover agent); State v. Gabladon, 735 P.2d 410 (Utah App. 
1987) (Defendant was seen with shoplifter and assisted shoplifter in placing bags of 
stolen goods in his trunk and also accompanied another in obtaining refund for stolen 
goods from store); State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987) (Defendant purchased 
stolen goods from undercover agent); State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985) 
(Defendant purchased stolen ring from police informant); State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1984) (Defendant picked-up as passenger in stolen vehicle). 
Hughes asserts that the evidence is insufficient to establish that at the time he 
initially received or retained the car that he knew or had reason to believe that it was 
stolen property. First, Shumway gave Hughes permission to exercise control over her 
vehicle and even gave him the keys so that he could drive her to the hospital (R. 164 at 
98-99, 110, 114). Second, Shumway also acknowledged that while she did not give 
Hughes permission to keep the vehicle, she also did not give him instructions on what 
to do with it (R. 164 at 111, 115, 117). Accordingly, when Hughes received and 
initially retained the vehicle it was with the explicit and implicit permission of 
Shumway and it was not until some unspecified future period when his retention of the 
vehicle became unauthorized control over the vehicle. But clearly when Hughes 
initially retained the vehicle it was not stolen property nor was there any evidence that 
Hughes, at that point, believed the property was stolen. Instead the evidence showed 
that Hughes was not sure what to do with the car after Shumway was taken to the 
hospital and that he panicked and instead continued to retain the vehicle; and that it was 
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only this continued retention which created any unauthorized control of the car and any 
possible intent to deprive Shumway of possession of the vehicle (R. 164 at 93, 96, 
104). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING 
TO AMEND THE INFORMATION TO UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL 
OF A MOTOR VEHICLE PURSUANT TO STATE v. HILL 
Hughes asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to amend the 
information from receiving stolen property to unauthorized control of a motor vehicle 
pursuant to State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984). Hughes further asserts that this 
error was both obvious and harmful. 
The defendant in Hill received money from an undercover agent for one ounce 
of baking soda which he claimed was cocaine. He was convicted of theft by deception, 
a second degree felony, and appealed on the ground that his conduct was more 
specifically governed by the statute which prohibits distribution of an imitation 
controlled substance. Hill, 688 P.2d at 451. The Utah Supreme Court agreed and held 
that "when an individual's conduct can be construed to be in violation of two 
overlapping statutes, the more specific statute governs." Hill, 688 P.2d at 451. 
Hughes asserts that the holding in Hill is applicable to the case at hand. Hill's 
conduct was fully covered by two statutes-one a more general statute (theft by 
deception) and one that was more specific (distribution of an imitation controlled 
substance). Hughes asserts that the evidence introduced at trial establishes that his 
conduct was likewise covered by a general (theft by receiving stolen property) and a 
specific (unauthorized control of a motor vehicle or joyriding) statute. - . 
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Clearly both Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 (theft by receiving stolen 
property) and Utah Code Annotated §41-1 a-1314 (unauthorized control of a motor 
vehicle) overlap. Both statutes require an intent to deprive owners of property. Both 
statutes require that the defendant exercise unauthorized control of said property. I lie 
theft by receiving statute requires that the defendant either "receive, retain or dispose" 
of property belonging to another while one element of the joyriding statute is thai the 
defendant "exercise iinauthorized control" over a motor vehicle belonging to another. 
However, Hughes asserts that the joyriding statute codified al ' Jiiih < '< sfe 
Annotated § 11 I n 1 * 14 which makes it a crime to exercise unauthorized control over a 
motor vehicle without consent and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of 
possession ot the motor vehicle more specifically covers his conduct of failing to return 
Shumway's vehicle after she had gave him the keys and asked hmi u» drive her to ilie 
hospital. See State i lefevre, 825 P.2d 681 n.5 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1992) (Had communications fraud statute been enacted at time ot offense 
• then it would have more specifically covered the defendant's conduct than the more 
general, overlapping theft by deception statute). 
Accordingly, Hughes asserts that based on the facts introduced at trial the trial 
court committed error in failing to amend the information f^t by receiving stolen 
property to unauthorized control of a motor vehicle (joyriding). Hughes also asserts 
that this error was obvious as Hughes had requested that the theft by recei\ ing charge 
be dismissed for insufficient evidence and that the jury be instructed on the joyriding 
offense. Moreover, the doctrine set forth mHiil is well established and has been I ised 
for nearly twenty-years. Hughes likewise asserts that the failure to amend the 
information was harmful and prejudicial. Theft by ieeeivnig an operable motor vehicle 
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is a second-degree felony punishable up to fifteen years in the state prison while 
joyriding is either a class A misdemeanor or a third degree felony punishable by no 
more than five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Therefore, Hughes requests that this Court conclude that because his conduct can 
be construed to be in violation of two overlapping statutes, the more specific statu te--
which in this case is unauthorized control of a motor vehicle-governs; and that the trial 
court's failure to amend the information to joyriding constitutes both obvious and 
harmful error. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Hughes asks that this Court reverse his conviction for 
theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of June, 2002. 
. ::.:—xr. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 
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\ 
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 3rd day of June, 
2002. 
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76-6-408 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property, without taking 
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the property when he 
obtains the property or at any time prior to taking the measures desig-
nated in paragraph (1). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-407, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-407. ^ 
a 
* 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 13. 
§ 111 et seq. 
76-6-408. Receiving stc >len property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property \ 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or beUeving that it probably has % 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or adds in concealing, selling, or ^ 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, J 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 5 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the | 
case of an actor who: j 
(a) is found in possession or control of otlm pnipprtv stolen on 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the] 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or dispose 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable! 
value; or .H 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker orj 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or! 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, an 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtain^ 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property tbj 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; ..,;!| 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at thq 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and j 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing ii 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and ever] 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails ti 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to hatj 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen ci 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. I 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidenc 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or person* 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker < 
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MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 41-la-1314 
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2001 amendment by ch. 345, effective 
2001, inserted "spay and neuter" in 
Subsections (3)(c) and C5)(c). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 369, effective 
July 1, 2001, inserted "clean fuel" in Subsec-
tions (3)(c) and {b){c) and made a stylistic 
change. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
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L-la-1220. Registration reinstatement fee. 
\{1) At the time application is made for reinstatement or renewal of regis-
ition of a motor vehicle after a revocation of the registration under Subsec-
lon 41-la-110(2), the applicant shall pay a registration reinstatement fee of 
noo. 
(2) The fee imposed under Subsection (1): 
(a) is in addition to any other fee imposed under this chapter; and 
(b) shall be deposited in the Uninsured Motorist Identification Re-
stricted Account created in Section 41-12a-806. 
(3) The division shall waive the registration reinstatement fee imposed 
ider this section if: 
(a) the registration was revoked under Subsection 41-la-110(2)(b); and 
(b) a person had owner's or operator's "security in effect for the vehicle at 
the time of the alleged violation or on the day following the time limit 
provided after the second notice under Subsection 41-12a-804(2). 
History: C. 1953, 41-la«1220, enacted by 
L-1998, ch. 35, § 2; 2000, ch. 345, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 2000, increased the 
registration reinstatement fee in Subsection (1) 
to $100, added Subsections (2Xb) and (3), and 
made stylistic changes. 
PART 13 
OFFENSES AND PENALTIES *o£-z~:: 
41-la-1314. Unauthorized control for extended time. ^ _ 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a 
person to exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle that is not his 
own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian, and with the intent 
to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of possession of theinotor 
vehicle. . y ; •;,-.- ,iciZ 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle to its 
control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied because of the 
owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the 
motor vehicle by the same or a different person. 
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if: 
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle to the owner or lawful 
custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of unlawful control; or 
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing 
the offense: - • 
(i) the motor vehicle is damaged in an amount of $500 or more; 
(ii) the motor vehicle is used to commit a felony; or 
(iii) the motor vehicle is damaged in any amount to facilitate entry 
into it or its operation. 
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the 
person, or an agent of the person, returned the motor vehicle within 24 hours. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / 7 A 
The essential elements of the crime of Theft by receiving stolen property are as follows: 
1. That the defendant 
2. On or about January 17, 2001 
3. In Utah County, Utah; 
4. Retained property of another; 
5. Knowing that the property had been stolen; 
6. Intending to deprive the owner of it; 
7. And the property stolen was an operable motor vehicle. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or 
more of the essential elements of the crime charged, you must acquit the defendant. But if the 
State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of 
the offense as set forth above, the defendant is guilty of the offense charged in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo,Utah 84606 
Telephone: 801-370-8026 
Fax: 801-370-8051 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUKi' 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY LEON HUGHES 
UNKNOWN 
DOB: 10/24/1974 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
Case no. Q((Lf Q#2>U 
Judgc
 jsK 
O I M 
KAY BRYSON, Utah County Attomey> State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the following 
crime(s); 
COUNT 1: THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a second degree felony, in 
violation of 76-6-408, in that Jeffery Leon Hughes, on or about January 17,2001, in Utah County, 
Utah, received, retained or disposed of property of another, knowing that the property had been stolen or 
believing that it probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling 
or withholding the property, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
thereof, and the property stolen was an operable motor vehicle. 
COUNT 2: DRIVING ON SUSPENSION/REVOCATION, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation 
of 53-3-227, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that Jeffeiy Leon Hughes, on or about January 
177 2001, did willfully and unlawfully drive a motor vehicle in Utah County, Utah, at a time when his 
driver's license had been suspended or revoked. 
COUNT 3: SPEEDING, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 41-6-46, in that Jeffery Leon 
Hughes, on or about January 17,2001, in Utah County, Utah, did operate a vehicle at a speed greater 
than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing, to wit: 48 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour zone. 
Information is based on evidence sworn to by: Richard Hales, Utah County Major Crimes Task Force 
Defendant appears by: Summons ( ) Warranto In-Custody (X ) 
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